This paper introduces and studies a new type of logical construction, which allows to combine various non-classical propositional logics with the temporal or modal background. The possible candidates include (but are not restricted to) a number of epistemic, multi-agent, deontological and other well-studied logics. In this construction, that we call refinement, the Kripke structure of a chosen Kripke complete logic is imposed on clusters of the background transitive frame. Refinements fit in a wider framework of fibred logics, while having some unique features. First of all, when applied to classes of frames of Kripke complete logics, refinement preserves good meta-logical properties of constituent logics, in contrast with the well-known products of logics. Another advantage of refinements is that they allow for augmented languages of considerable expressive power, while preserving good meta-logical and semantical properties. In particular we show that refinement of logics preserves the effective finite model property and decidability for a wide class of constituent logics.
Introduction
Over the years there have been numerous attempts at combining logics -hybrid, fusion, product logics providing by far not complete list. The impetus came from the requirements of applications, which more and more often are formally considered as systems with rich ontologies. There are two main approaches toward combining propositional logic, that assume full combination of signatures. One is product and another is fusion [1] . Basic fusions do not allow for interaction of modalities, while products of logics are undecidable even in cases of simple constituent logics, like S 5 [7] . A powerful unifying mechanism of ''fibred'' logics was proposed by D.Gabbay [6] , as a generalization of these approaches (see [2] for the latest development on the subject).
Let us informally introduce the main construction of the paper -refinements. Suppose we have a class of Kripke frames K and let F = W ,R be a reflexive transitive Kripke frame. A cluster is a maximal subset X of a frame, such that the restriction of the accessibility relation to X is the universal relation on X (i.e., X ×X ). Consider a family X ={F C ∈ K | C is a cluster of F},
Refinements of logics
Suppose I ⊆ N\{0}. A Kripke multi-frame F with the Kripke signature {R i } i∈I is a pair F := W ,{R i } i∈I , where W =∅ is the set of worlds or states, and each R i is a binary relation on elements of W . W is also called the universe of F, and the R i 's are called accessibility relations. We will write R I instead of {R i } i∈I .
Let F = W ,R I be a Kripke multi-frame. For every subset J ⊆ I , a proper R J -cluster of F is a maximal under inclusion subset C of W , such that the restrictions of all R j , j ∈ J , to C is the universal relation. If a is irreflexive element of F with respect to at least one R j , j ∈ J , then {a} is a degenerative R J -cluster. Proper and degenerative clusters are called simply R J -clusters. We denote by Cl R J (F) the set of all R J -clusters of F. If J = I we will usually write Cl(F) instead of Cl R J (F) and refer to an R J -cluster as simply a cluster.
For every J ⊆ I , R J -clusters cover the respective frame. In addition, if all R j , j ∈ J , are transitive then distinct R J -clusters do not intersect. In this case, whenever a ∈ W , we denote by C R J (a) the unique R J -cluster of F that contains a. In particular, in the transitive case any R J -cluster of F is a C R J -cluster of the type C R J (a) for some a ∈ W . REMARK 2.1. An example of a non-transitive frame that do not have unique covering by clusters is given by a tolerance -a set with a reflexive, symmetric binary relation. On the other hand, there are non-transitive frames that do have unique covering by clusters. A simple example is non-transitive trees with irreflexive nodes. In what follows, we will consider only transitive accessibility relations, whenever we need unique covering by clusters.
A Kripke model with the Kripke signature R I is a tuple W ,R I ,V , where W ,R I is a Kripke multi-frame with the accessibility relations R I ={R i } i∈I , and V : X → P(W ) is a valuation of some subset X ⊆ Var of variables.
For Kripke models and frames we will mainly use the following notation: whenever F is a frame of Kripke signature R I , then W F is its universe, R 
Thus, a refinement is the frame of the combined Kripke signature R I ∪R J , where the R J -structures of frames, indexed by clusters, is imposed on respective clusters of the frame F in addition to the existing R I -relations. Note that for a given frame F and each indexed family h : Cl(F) → K (which we have written above as {F C ∈ K | C ∈ Cl(F)}), the refinement of F by h is uniquely defined, But there can be the whole class of refinements of the given frame, subject to various choices of h : Cl(F) → K.
We denote Ref (K,J ) the class of all refinements of frames from the class K by frames from the class J . The frames from the class K we will call basic, and the frames from J -secondary structures.
Suppose a modal language L ={∧,∨,→,¬}∪{♦ i } i∈I is fixed. We fix an enumerable set Var := {x 1 ,x 2 ,x 3 ,...} of propositional variables. Well-formed formulas of the language L (L-formulas) are defined by the following grammar
The set of all L-formulas is denoted by Fm L . For a formula α, Var (α) will denote the set of variables occurring in α.
We will use the following shortcuts:
By L I we denote the standard multi-modal language {∧,∨,→,¬}∪{♦ i } i∈I , where all ♦ i are assumed to have standard interpretation, i.e., given a Kripke model M of signature
(where we write (M,w) α to say that the formula α is valid or true or holds in the model M at the world w). The truth relation for other L I -formulas is defined as usual
We will call the standard modalities (or their duals: The multi-modal logic K n , n =|I |, is the minimal under inclusion set of formulas K n ⊆ Fm L I such that it contains all the tautologies of the classical propositional logic and all the substitutional variants of the following axiom:
and is also closed under substitutions and under the rules:
• modus ponens:
Whenever, in addition, L is closed under necessitation rules, then it is called a normal multi-modal logic.
Suppose K is a class of Kripke frames of R I -signature. Let L I be the respective modal language. We denote by Log(K) the logic
where K α means that F α for each F ∈ K. It is indeed a multi-modal normal logic, because it is closed under uniform substitutions, modus ponens and necessitation rules for all 2-modalities.
If we have a multi-modal logic L, let Fr (L) be the class of all frames F of the respective Kripke signature, such that all theorems of L are valid in
Suppose we have two Kripke complete multi-modal logics B and S (that we call basic and secondary logic, respectively) of Kripke signatures R I and R J , I ∩J =∅, and let B be transitive. Let L be the language {∧,∨,→,¬}∪{♦ i } i∈I ∪{♦ i } j∈J .
We define the refinement of B by S, denoted by B S or Ref (B,S), the logic
Log(Ref (Fr (B),Fr (S))).
It is easy to see from the definition that so defined set of formulas is indeed a multi-modal normal logic.
Let
be a given modal language. A clause over variables x 1 ,...,x n is a formula of the kind
where x i are variables, t is a function t :{0,...,m}×{1,...,n}→{0,1}, and for each formula α, α 0 := ¬α, α 1 := α. It is easy to see that there are only 2 n(m+1) distinct clauses over a set of n variables. We denote the set of all clauses over variables x 1 ,...,x n by (x 1 ,...,x n ).
For every θ ∈ (X ) and i ∈{0,...,m}, we denote
We say that a clause θ is realized in a model M, if there is a world w ∈ M, such that (M,w) θ.
Given a Kripke model M of the Kripke signature R I with the finite dom V M , every world
We will omit the subscript in θ M (w), whenever the model M is clear from context. Also, we write for every i ∈{0,...,m}
In particular, µ 0 (M) is the set of those variables, which hold at least at one world in the model M. 
Thus the clause-preserving mapping f : M 1 → M 2 modulo , guarantees that:
. f preserves truth-values of clauses from .
Note, that the inverse of a clause-preserving mapping does not necessarily preserve the accessibility relations, unlike the traditional notion of filtration [13] and its more general variant -selective filtration [5] . 
Decision procedures for refinements of logics
We will be representing formulas by inference rules.
A rule r is valid in a frame F, if, for every valuation V of variables Var (r), F V r. If the rule r is not valid in F, then there is a valuation V such that F V r. In that case we say that r is refuted in F (by V ). A rule r over the modal language L ={¬,∧,∨,
is said to be in the reduced normal form if
1)
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and each disjunct θ j is a clause
for some t. We will also denote {θ 1 ,...,θ s } as (r). Two rules r 1 , r 2 are equivalent over a Kripke class K, if for any K-frame F:
For a formula α, Sub(α) denotes the set of subformulas of α. For a rule r = α/β: Sub(r) :=
Sub(α)∪Sub(β).
It has been shown in Rybakov [9] that any modal inference rule can be transformed to an equivalent rule in the reduced normal form. Using essentially the same technique we can transform to normal reduced forms all rules over the language in question.
Let L ={¬,∧,∨,→}∪{f i } i∈I be a language, where f i are unary connectives with A fixed interpretation in all frames of some class K (some of them can be Kripke modalities). Suppose that for all f i , i ∈ I holds
Then any rule r = α/β can be transformed in exponential time to an equivalent over K rule r nf in the reduced normal form.
PROOF. The draft of the proof follows. We shall specify the general algorithm described in Lemma 3.1.3 and Theorem 3.1.11 [10] for the pertinent language.
Let r = α/β be an inference rule. We will need a set of new variables Z ={z γ | γ ∈ Sub(r)}. The first step is to replace r = α/β with r 1 = α∧(z β ↔ β)/z β . Since r can be refuted in F if and only if r 1 can be refuted in F, for all frames F, the rules r and r 1 are equivalent.
Inductive step: suppose we obtained at the i-th step the rule r i = γ i /z β . We call a formula δ ∈ Sub(γ i )∩Sub(r) terminal, if it is not a variable and not a proper subformula of any other formula in Sub(γ i )∩Sub(r). Let T i be the set of all terminal formulas at the i-th step.
We replace the rule r i with a new one r i+1 = γ i+1 /z β , where
and t i (γ i ) is the formula obtained from γ i by replacing all terminal subformulas δ with z δ . It is straightforward to check that r i and r i+1 are equivalent over K. Note that every inductive step reduces the maximal height of non-boolean subformulas of the rule. Therefore after a finite number of steps we come to a rule with a premise γ N , which is a boolean combination of primitives of the form x or * x, where x is a propositional variable and * is in {f i | i ∈ I }.
Finally, we transform the premise of the obtained rule r N = γ N /z β into a perfect disjunctive normal form over primitives. This requires no more than exponential time on the number of variables, i.e., on the number of subformulas of the original rule (the same as for reduction of any boolean formula to the perfect disjunctive normal form).
As seen from the proof of Lemma 3.1, the variables in the reduced form represent the subformulas of α and β. In particular, the variable x 1 stands for the conclusion β itself. From the definition of the normal reduced form, it is clear that under any given valuation of variables only one θ j can hold true at a given world.
Thus, we have for every L I -formula α and every frame F ∈ K:
Therefore the following lemma holds:
Let L be a Kripke complete logic over the language {¬,∧,∨,→}∪{f i } i∈I , such that
Then a formula α is a theorem of L iff the rule (x → x/α) nf is valid in all L-frames.
Further on, rules will always be of the form (3.1). Let θ be the clause of the form (3.2), over the modal language L ={¬,∧,∨,→}∪{♦ i } i∈I . Suppose J ⊆ I . We denote by θ J the following clause
In the model M we replace each R J -submodel M C with M C . We will call the new model M . The underlying frame of M is a refinement of the B-frame W M ,R
Clearly there are no more than 2 | (r)| distinct ∼-equivalence classes. For every class we can choose a canonical representative -a model with the minimal number of elements. Let us call M the canonical representative for M C , where = (M C ). If we replace each model M C , C ∈ Cl R I (F), by its canonical representative, then the resulting model still refutes r and satisfies the conditions of our lemma. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that all ∼-equivalence classes, defined on the model M, contain only isomorphic models.
Let C := { (M C ) | M C ∈ M} (in particular, C ⊆ P( (r))). We will need a set of new variables {z | ∈ C}.
Let us consider the model M , the underlying frame of which is made from F M by ''stripping off'' the secondary accessibility relations R J . More precisely,
is defined as follows
In particular, a variable z is satisfiable at the worlds of those and only those R I -clusters that have the same subset of (r)-clauses satisfiable on them. Consider the set of
. By the condition of the lemma, there is a clause-filtration of M modulo onto a finite R I -model N . Now we need to restore the secondary structure on N . For that purpose, we take for every ∈ C the set of worlds
In its turn, C splits into a number of non-intersecting subsets:
depending on the truth-values of primitives (
In fact, each C ,l i is the image of one or many complete clusters of the model M . Since N is a clause-filtration of M and preimages of w ∈ C ,l i were in the R I -clusters of the model M , then each set C ,l i is a subset of a cluster of the model N . We build a new model N by replacing each C ,l i with M (adding elements to N , if necessary). The satisfiability in N of L I parts of (r)-clauses is preserved (with respect to the model M), by the properties of clause-filtration. The satisfiability of the primitives (♦ j x k ) t(j,k) , j ∈ J , is preserved, since R J -structures of N are isolated inside of R I -clusters of N .
By the length of a formula α, written as |α|, we understand the number of subformulas of α. Clearly
where (α) is the number of letters in the recording of α and C 1 ,C 2 are some constants.
Logics of Kripke meta-models 11 DEFINITION 3.6. A Kripke logic L has the finite model property, whenever for every formula α / ∈ L, there is a finite model M such that M L and M α.
If, in addition, the model M can be chosen to be of the size not more than p(|α|), for some recursive function p : N → N, then L has the p-effective finite model property. is a refinement of a logic B by a logic S, where   1 . B is a multi-modal transitive logic over the language L I , that admits strong clausefiltration, 2. S is a multi-modal logic, closed under p-bounded clause preserving mappings, Then B S has the q-effective finite model property, where
PROOF. By Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5
If under conditions of Theorem 3.7 the class of finite models of B S is decidable (i.e., the set of isomorphic classes of finite B S -models is decidable), then B S is decidable.
Some Applications
We say that a Kripke complete logic L admits strong filtration, whenever for every
, there is a finite set of formulas , such that there is a model N α, which is a filtration of M modulo and F N ∈ Fr (L). The logics that admit strong filtration form the majority of standard logics to which the filtration method (see [3] ) can be applied. They include K 4,S 4,S 5 and so on. If L is a Kripke complete unary modal logic, we denote L N the N -fusion of L, i.e. the logic over the Kripke signature {R 1 ,...,R N }, generated by the class of frames K such that for every frame
is an L-frame.
As an easy corollary of Theorem 3. We also can apply Theorem 3.7 to refinements that have tense basic logics.
If L is a Kripke complete mono-modal logic over the Kripke signature {R}, we denote TL the associated tense logic over the Kripke signature {R,R −1 }, generated by the class of L-frames, in which R −1 is interpreted as the inverse of R. The presented in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.5 two-phase construction, can be also used for multimodal logics over languages augmented by additional (non-Kripke) operators. As an example, we will show, using Theorem 3.7 , that the refinement of the tense logic TS 4 by the multi-modal logic S 5 N augmented with an additional operator 3 CK is decidable, where operator 3 CK is the existential counterpart of the ''Common Knowledge''-operator [4] . DEFINITION 4.6. Suppose we have a Kripke complete multi-modal logic L over a Kripke signature R I and let L := ∧,∨,→,¬,{3 i } i∈I ,∇ be the language of L augmented with an additional unary operation ∇.
Suppose that the semantical interpretation of ∇ is fixed on Fr (L), i.e., for every model M with F M ∈ Fr (L) the truth relation (M,·) ·⊆W M ×Fm L is defined. Suppose also that under this semantical interpretation:
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We define the logic L(∇) be the set of formulas
In the case of 3 CK , semantics is defined as follows:
REMARK 4.7.
1. Although the operation 3 CK is unary and can be seen as a modality of sort, it is not a Kripke-modality, because it cannot be standardly associated with any binary relation on a Kripke frame. 2. Note that 3 CK cannot be expressed finitary in terms of Kripke-modalities, except through a fixed-point definition [4] .
It is easy to check that 
where ♦ + , ♦ − refer to the ''future'' and ''past'' tense modalities, ♦ i -to the accessibility relation R i (i = 1,...,N ). non-isomorphic models based on this clusters, where K is the number of variables. Therefore, after carefully identifying the isomorphic copies, which has the same subset of I (r(α)) satisfiable on them, we obtain a finite S 5 N (3 CK )-model of the size less or equal to 2
and it is easy to see that satisfiability of all (r(α)) is preserved. The rest follows from Theorem 3.7.
Future Plans
There is a number of questions concerning the construction of refinement that it is necessary to investigate. Refinements are Kripke complete by definition, but the question wether refinement preserves finite axiomatizability remains open. To improve complexity bounds, it would be desirable to try to implement in Lemma 3.5 filtration not by clusters, but by elements.
In the case when the basic logic is defined by frames of linear pre-orders, the second-phase of the procedure, described in Lemma 3.5 fails (completely parallel to the isolated monomodal case). But it was shown in [11] by a technique similar to presented in this paper, that the refinement of such basic logic though does not admit strong filtration, nevertheless has a variant of the finite model property. It would be interesting to generalize Theorem 3.7 on such cases.
It would be also interesting (though difficult) to find, what necessary and sufficient conditions an additional non-Kripke operator must satisfy in order to Theorem 3.7 still go through. From the example of Theorem 4.8, we know that such operator might even be not finitely definable in terms of Kripke modalities.
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